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Abstract
This paper analyses theoretical effects of minimum wages on employment and the
wage distribution under a frictional setting. I review new developments in search the-
ory and discuss the influence of minimum wages on wages and employment under
each setting. Thereby, a major theoretical focus of the paper is the integration of
heterogeneity on both sides of the market in equilibrium search models. In the homo-
geneous case minimum wages do not affect employment, while in the heterogenous
case theoretical results are mixed. There is no unique connection between unemploy-
ment and minimum wages, and the effect can be positive, zero or negative. However,
the most advanced models, integrating heterogeneity on both sides of the market,
seem to support the hypothesis that an increase in the minimum wage generally leads
to an increase in unemployment as well.
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1 Wage dispersion and unemployment: Alternative views
Many economists argue that institutions as minimum wages compress the wage struc-
ture and thereby contribute to high unemployment, especially for low-skilled individu-
als. This hypothesis is common in the economic literature in the context of the different
experiences in the US and Continental Europe regarding wage dispersion and unem-
ployment [see e.g. Katz and Autor, 1999, Blau and Kahn, 2002, Blanchard, 2006].
Krugman [1994, p.62] states: “...that growing U.S. inequality and growing European
unemployment are different sides of the same coin”. Many observers argue that skill-
based technical progress, reorganization processes or globalization have decreased
the demand for low-skilled work in industrialized countries, thereby lowering the mar-
ket wage. However, in Continental Europe institutional reasons have prevented wages
from falling (enough), causing a reaction via the amount of labor employed and thereby
increasing unemployment of the low-skilled.1 This view is not uncontested for several
reasons. Firstly, changes in employment rates in Europe were quite similar across
skill groups and changes in the employment rates of the low-skilled were quite similar
in Europe and the US [Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999]. Another reason is that institu-
tional differences can explain differences in unemployment and inequality levels, but
not in changes. Explaining changes in these variables requires changes in institutions.
The decline of the minimum wage in the U.S., however, is often argued to be such an
institutional change. In neo-classical labor market models, it is assumed that the piv-
otal determinant of wages is marginal productivity. If people differ in their marginal
productivity, in equilibrium, they obtain different wages. Thus, the wage distribution
is determined by the distribution of marginal productivities. Under these assumptions
binding minimum wages generally lower the wage dispersion of those workers em-
ployed, but at the same time tend to reduce employment. This is the case, because
then some individuals are too unproductive to be still employed at the higher minimum
wage. Thus, a minimum wage causes structural unemployment.
The situation is different under a frictional setting. The reason is that frictions are a
source of monopsony power for employers and that wages are below marginal pro-
ductivity [Manning, 2003b]. Clearly, there is potential for redistribution of rents without
altering employment. Do minimum wages purely redistribute rents from the firms to
the workers or do they cause structural unemployment as well? I show that the answer
to this question is ambiguous and that the discussed model variants yield different re-
sults. I obtain mostly zero employment effects. However, there are cases, where the
minimum wage generates even positive employment effects, because it does not alter
the incentive of the firm to employ individuals but it does increase the incentive for
individuals to work.
Search frictions in the present case arise because of incomplete information where
the process of generating information is time-consuming. Under this setting, identical
workers can earn different wages and the sources of wage dispersion are search du-
1 Institutional factors that can imply wage compression are minimum wages, strong unions, benefit
payments and the like [see, e.g. Weiss and Garloff, 2005].
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ration and luck. A central result of these theories challenges the neo-classical frame-
work: rising wage dispersion is associated with rising unemployment. Low wage dis-
persion is associated with low unemployment. This contradicts the basic idea on the
relationship of wage dispersion and unemployment presented above.2
In what follows, I present different search models of increasing complexity (see table
1) and examine the effect of minimum wages on the realized wage distribution and
employment. Since the labor market performance of individuals and the performance
of firms are extremely diverse, heterogeneity is seen to be an important feature of
labor markets and thus a focus lies on the integration of heterogeneity in search mod-
els. Subsections 2.1 and 2.2 establish the theoretical basis on which most models are
built upon. In subsection 2.1, I present basics from partial search theory with exoge-
nous wage dispersion and derive the reservation wage property. In subsection 2.2, I
establish the baseline model, a model with an endogenous wage distribution and ho-
mogeneous individuals and firms. In order to discuss more realistic settings, I discuss
model extensions that allow heterogeneity on one or the other side of the market and
which serve to check the sensitivity of the results of the baseline model.
2 Frictional labor markets
2.1 Exogenous wage dispersion: basic results
As a reference scenario and to understand later derivations, I briefly introduce the
partial search model. Starting point from search theory is that working places are
heterogenous in some relevant aspect. Job searching individuals have an informa-
tion problem. They must acquire the relevant information about the jobs. This time-
consuming process of obtaining information in the simple baseline search model is
modeled by an exogenous hazard rate at which individuals receive job offers and thus
information about certain job characteristics they are interested in. In the simplest ver-
sion, job seekers maximize the present value of their lifetime income. So, the wage is
the only relevant characteristic of the job. The optimization problem of the job seeker
thus consists in getting as high as possible a wage, without searching too long. Under
the Poisson assumption (for the probability of obtaining a job offer) search is sequen-
tial and rational behavior is given by a critical wage level, where wage offers above are
accepted and wage offers below are rejected (see below). The critical wage is called
reservation wage and defines the expected search duration which itself determines
the expected wage level. Wages that differ across individuals can be explained by the
luck of a high wage offer and by different reservation wages.
The following illustration is inspired by Cahuc and Zylberberg [2004, chapter 3.1] and
Franz [2006, chapter 6.2].
2 This idea is taken as a test between the frameworks presented in Weiss and Garloff [2005].
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Table 1: Heterogeneity in search models
Frictions Endogenous
Wage Disper-
sion
Heterogeneity of
employees
Heterogeneity of
firms
Neo-classical
Model Frame-
work
- X X -
Partial search
theory
X - X X
Burdett and
Mortensen
[1998]
X X - -
Burdett and
Mortensen
[1998] with con-
tinuous search
costs, Van den
Berg and Ridder
[1997]
X X X -
Bontemps,
Robin, and
Van Den Berg
[2000], Ace-
moglu und
Shimer [2000]
X X - X
Postel-Vinay
and Robin
[2002b], Holzner
and Launov
[2005]
X X X X
Assumptions
The assumptions under which the reservation wage property and the reservation wage
can be deduced are concluded in what follows.
• (B0) Environment: The model is dynamic, time will be treated as continuous and
the environment is stationary.
• (B1) Employees: Individuals exclusively either work or search, which precludes
both on-the-job search and the existence of inactive individuals. There is no
choice in the number of hours worked or searched. Individuals are risk-neutral,
have rational expectations and maximize expected present value of their life time
income over an infinite time horizon. Job seekers obtain z = b− a per time unit,
where b are unemployment benefits and a search costs. Employees obtain a
wage w per time unit. The value of unemployment is called WU (the expected
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income), while WL(w) is the value of employment at the wage w.3 The stationary
wage offer distribution H(w) is known to job seekers, while the offered wage of
a specific firm is generally not known.4
• (B2) Search: Search is sequential, which means that if an individual has received
an offer, he decides whether to accept or not and then in the case of rejection,
i.e. if the wage offer is below the reservation wage wR, continues search.5 This
is an optimal stopping problem, since job offers that have been rejected once
cannot be accepted later on [Dixit, 1990]. The future is discounted at interest
rate r.
• (B3) Transition rates: At an exogenous, constant rate λ an individual samples
independent wage offers from H(w). Individuals leave unemployment at a rate
that is the product of the job offer rate and their acceptance probability. Em-
ployees loose their job at the exogenous, constant rate δ (the job destruction
rate). The number of sampled job offers and the number of terminated jobs are
poisson-distributed.
The basic model
The value of employment WL(w) at wage w can be derived as follows. In a small time
interval6 dt a worker obtains the wage wdt. With probability δdt the worker looses her
job in this time interval. If losing the job the worker is left with value WU . With the
complementary probability (1− δdt) the worker remains employed. Under stationarity
the value of employment is constant over time and therefore the worker is left with
WL(w). In case of linear discounting, the Bellmann-equation is:
WL(w) =
1
1 + rdt
{wdt+ δdtWU + (1− δdt)WL(w)}
rWL(w) = w + δ(WU −WL(w)). (1)
The second line can be found multiplying by (1 + rdt), subtracting WL(w) and dividing
by dt. The value of employment at the reservation wage must equal the value of
unemployment. Rewriting (1) as WL(w) − WU = w−rWUr+δ , taking into account that
∂WL(w)
∂w =
1
r+δ > 0 and that WU is independent from the wage previously paid, then wR
is a unique solution to WL(wR) = WU and is given from wR = rWU as the reservation
wage. The offered wage must be at least as high as what the worker would have
gotten if she had remained unemployed. This is demonstrated in figure 1.
3 WL(w) and WU are called value equations or Bellmann-equations. These terms have been coined in
the theory of dynamic programming. For mathematical details see, eg, Dixit [1990], chapter 11.
4 The wage offer distribution is the distribution of wages when randomly drawing a firm, whereas the
wage distribution refers to the distribution of wages when randomly drawing a worker.
5 I assume sequential search, since it has been shown that sequential search is superior to fixed sample
search [McCall, 1965].
6 The small time interval must be chosen such that the Poisson probability that two events occur in that
time interval is zero.
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Figure 1: Calculation of the reservation wage
The value of unemployment can be calculated as follows. Job seekers obtain z = b−a
per time unit. At poisson rate λ job seekers obtain job offers w as independent draws
from H(w). If an individual gets a job offer, the expected value is given by Wλ which
consists in two components. The first component is the share of job offers that the
job seeker rejects since the wage is below the reservation wage H(wR) multiplied
by the corresponding value of rejection WU . The second part is the complementary
probability, multiplied by the average value of an accepted job offer:
Wλ = H(wR)WU+(1−H(wR))Ew[WL(w)|w > wR] =
∫ wR
0
WUdH(w)+
∫ ∞
wR
WL(w)dH(w).
(2)
With probability (1− λdt) the job seeker does not obtain a job offer in dt. The value in
this case remains WU = Wλ¯ =
∫∞
0 WUdH(w).
7 Thus:
WU =
1
1 + rdt
(zdt+ λdtWλ + (1− λdt)WU )
rWU = z + λ
∫ ∞
wR
(WL(w)−WU )dH(w). (3)
The second line follows by solving the equation for rWU and resuming the remainder
under an integral.
Recognizing that WL(w) − WU = w−rWUr+δ and wR = rWU the reservation wage is
implicitly defined as:
wR = rWU = z+
λ
r + δ
∫ ∞
wR
(w−wR)dH(w) = z+ λ
r + δ
[(1−H(wR))(E(w|w > wR)−wR)].
(4)
Subtracting z on both sides of the equation, the left hand side is the instantaneous
cost of rejecting a wage offer wR. At the reservation wage the cost of waiting must
equal the expected gains from waiting. It is given by the probability that a job seeker
obtains a wage offer that is acceptable λ(1 − H(wR)), multiplied with the discounted
conditional expectation of the wage given it exceeds the reservation wage [Devine and
Kiefer, 1991, p.16/23].
Optimal behavior of the individuals is completely described by equation (4). A job
seeker with net income z, who is confronted with a job offer rate λ, with a job destruc-
tion rate δ, with an interest rate r and a wage offer distribution H(w) will accept any
job offer that exceeds wR and reject otherwise.
7 This is implied by the assumption that all model parameters are constant across time. Thus the value
equations satisfy this property as well.
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On-the-job search
Now, assume that employed job seekers obtain job offers at the exogenous job offer
rate λL as well and that they do not incur search costs (aL = 0).8 The assumptions
(B0), (B1’), (B2) and (B3) are assumed to hold where:
• (B1’): as (B1), but: Employees search on the job, receive independent job offers
at constant exogenous rate λL from the wage offer distribution H(w) and do not
have any search cost.
One term must be added to the return to employment equation (1), which reflects the
expected gain from a job change. An employee accepts all job offers that exceed its
own wage w¯ [Mortensen and Neumann, 1988]. It follows:
rWL(w¯) = w¯ + δ(WU −WL(w¯)) + λL
∫ ∞
w¯
(WL(w)−WL(w¯))dH(w). (5)
The return to unemployment is still given by equation (3). Evaluating equation (5) at
wR, equalizing rWL(wR) with (3) and solving for wR yields:
wR = z + (λ− λL)
∫ ∞
wR
(WL(w)−WU )dH(w). (6)
Equation (6) can be rewritten in terms of the parameters of the model (see appendix
5.1):
wR = z + (λ− λL)
∫ wo
wR
1−H(w)
r + δ + λL(1−H(w))dw. (7)
Intuitively, the possibility to search on the job lowers the reservation wage, since this
opens the possibility to accept a low paid job and to search further on the job. If the
chance to get a good job is independent on the job seekers status (λL = λ), unem-
ployed job seekers will accept every job offer that exceeds net unemployment benefits
z. With the characterization of the reservation wage for unemployed job seekers and
the critical wage for employed job seekers, optimality in the behavior of the individuals
is guaranteed. Unemployed job seekers accept every wage offer that exceeds wR and
continue searching otherwise, while employed job seekers accept every job offer that
exceeds their current wage and continue working in their current job (and searching
for a better paid job) otherwise.
The reservation wage increases with unemployment benefits b, and with the proba-
bility to obtain a job offer when unemployed λ. It decreases with search cost a, the
probability to obtain a job offer when employed λL, the interest rate r and with the job
destruction rate δ. Given the impact of the parameters on the reservation wage, the
impact of the parameters on the average unemployment duration can be calculated,
which increases itself with the reservation wage.
8 The subscript L always confers to the employed individuals.
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2.2 Endogenous wage dispersion - the baseline model
It is not straightforward to establish dispersion of job characteristics across identical
firms as an equilibrium outcome. A necessary condition for the existence of equilibrium
wage dispersion is a positive connection between wage level and output [Burdett and
Judd, 1983]. If firms have monopsony power, firms make positive profits per employee.
If firms can attract additional workers by setting high wages, there exists a trade-off
between profits per worker and the number of workers in a firm. This means that there
is indeed a positive connection between wages and production. The model of Burdett
and Mortensen [1998] is based on this idea.
On-the-job search guarantees that part of the job seekers, namely the employed, can
compare wages. They compare their own wage with the wage of an alternative job
offer. This insures the positive relationship between wages and output. High wage
firms attract many new workers from competing firms, while loosing only little. As a
result they have a high employment, making low profits per employee. On the contrary
low wage firms have a low employment level, thereby making high profits per worker.
The assumptions of the model are given by (B0), (B1”), (B2), (B3), (B4), (B5) and (B6),
where:
• (B1”), as (B1’), but all N individuals produce an identical amount y of the con-
sumption good per time unit, which can be interpreted as labor productivity,
where y > wR holds and z is identical across all unemployed individuals.
• (B4) firms: An infinite amount of risk-neutral, c.p. identical firms on an interval
[0, 1] maximizes profits. There is nor market entrance or exit.
• (B5) wage formation: Firms determine wages ex ante from their profit maximiza-
tion calculus.9 This wage is payed forever, provided that the match does not
end.
• (B6) economy: Small open economy with two goods and an exogenous interest
rate r. The consumption good C is produced without capital (or with identical
capital endowment in firms without depreciation), marginal productivity of labor
is constant. The price of the consumption good is the numéraire, while w is the
price of labor.
Starting with the reservation wage for the unemployed, it is given by equation (7),
assuming that r = 0. Employed job seekers accept every wage offer that exceeds
their current wage. Equilibrium unemployment follows from stationarity and equating
in- and outflows to and from the pool of unemployed. In a small time interval dt λdt(1−
H(wR))U unemployed individuals find a job, while δdt(N − U) employees loose their
9 Since firms determine wages ex-ante, it is possible that there is a meeting between agents where
cooperation is profitable but where the match is not formed. Such a situation is called non-transferable
utility.
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job. Dividing by dt and building the limit for dt → 0, I obtain U˙ = δ(N − U) − λ(1 −
H(wR))U . Since firms that offer wages below the reservation wage make zero profits
and since, as shown below, in equilibrium all firms make positive profits H(wR) = 0
holds. Therefore equilibrium unemployment is
U =
δN
δ + λ(1−H(wR)) =
δN
δ + λ
. (8)
Let g(w) denote the density of the distribution of paid wages and h(w) denote the
density of the distribution of wage offers. The equilibrium employment of one firm that
offers wage w is given by l(w) = (N − U)g(w)/h(w). Then, L(w) = (N − U)G(w) =∫ w
0 l(ζ)dH(ζ) is the amount of employees, that is employed at a wage below w and
G(w) is the distribution of paid wages. Concentrating on employment changes in
firms in an interval dt that offer (and pay) wages above w, they have inflows from
the pool of unemployed and from firms that pay wages below w, while they loose
employees only through exogenous job destruction. Employees that make a job-to-
job transition remain in this wage class. Unemployed job seekers obtain a wage offer
with probability λdt which exceeds with probability (1−H(w)) the wage w. Individuals
that are employed at a wage below w obtain with probability λLdt a wage offer that
exceeds w with probability (1−H(w)). From this, total inflows are λdtU(1−H(w)) +
λLdtL(w)(1 −H(w)) = dt(λU + λLL(w))(1 −H(w)). With probability δdt exogenous
shocks destroy existing jobs. The amount of jobs in firms that pay wages above w is
given by N − U − L(w). In equilibrium, employment in firms that pay wages above w
is assumed constant (stationarity).
Solving for G(w) = L(w)N−U yields:
G(w) =
λU
(N − U)
H(w)
(λL(1−H(w)) + δ) =
δH(w)
(λL(1−H(w)) + δ) . (9)
The second equality follows from using equation (8). It shows the relationship between
the distribution of wage offers H(w) across firms and the distribution of paid wages in
a cross section of workers G(w).10 Since L′(w) = l(w)h(w), equilibrium employment
in firms that pay wage w, is given by:
l(w) =
λU(λL + δ)
(λL(1−H(w)) + δ)2 =
λδN(λL + δ)
(λL(1−H(w)) + δ)2(δ + λ) = δ(N−U)
(λL + δ)
(λL(1−H(w)) + δ)2 .
(10)
Because of a higher inflow rate and a smaller outflow rate, employment grows with
the wage: l′(w) > 0. In equilibrium, every firm pays a wage from the support of the
equilibrium wage offer distribution and makes expected profits of Π(w) = (y−w)l(w) =
λδN(y−wR)
(δ+λL)(δ+λ)
(see appendix 5.2), which are strictly positive.11 The wage offer density
h(w) is defined on the support [wR, wo], where wo = y−(y−wR)
(
δ
δ+λL
)2
(see appendix
10 These are different, since workers climb the job (wage) ladder through job-to-job transitions in the
course of their career.
11 Positive profits arise because search frictions are a source of monopsony power.
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5.2).
Taking into account that Π(w) = Π(w′) = (y−w)l(w) ∀(w,w′) ∈ [wR, wo]12 and equat-
ing the profit at the reservation wage with an arbitrary wage from the support of the
wage offer distribution, one obtains (y−w) λU(λL+δ)
(λL(1−H(w))+δ)2 = (y−wR)
λU(λL+δ)
(λL+δ)2
. Solving
for H(w) yields the equilibrium wage offer distribution.
H(w) =

0 for w < wR
λL+δ
λL
(
1−
√
y−w
y−wR
)
for wR ≤ w < wo
1 for w ≥ wo
 (11)
The distribution H does not contain mass points or wholes [Ridder and Van den Berg,
1997, p.101]. The corresponding density can be calculated as h(w) = H ′(w) =
λL+δ
2λL
√
1
(y−wR)(y−w) and is increasing in w. Plugging H(w) in equation (7) yields an ex-
pression for the reservation wage for this wage distribution: wR =
(δ+λL)
2z+(λ−λL)λLy
(δ+λL)2+(λ−λL)λL .
Thus, the reservation wage is a weighted mean of the net unemployment benefits z
and the labor productivity y.13 If individuals cannot change jobs (λL = 0) the reser-
vation wage equals z, wo = wR and one obtains the monopsony solution [Diamond,
1971]. If on the other hand the job offer rate on the job becomes big (λL → ∞), then
the frictions vanish and the wage offer distribution collapses to a mass point at y. The
same is true if there is no job destruction δ = 0 or no search friction for the unemployed
λ → ∞ (that is no unemployment). For all intermediary cases (0 < λL < ∞, U > 0)
the wage offer distribution has a positive variance. The monopsony power of the firms
depends on the degree of the friction. The higher the friction, i.e. the lower λL and
the higher δ, the higher is the monopsony power of the firms and both moments of the
wage distribution depend on this monopsony power [Van den Berg and Ridder, 1993].
Remarkably, the model generates an equilibrium wage dispersion across identical indi-
viduals. Further, it provides arguments for the empirical facts that big firms pay higher
wages than small firms and that senior workers gain on average more than their junior
counterparts. Problematic is however that the density of the distribution of paid wages
G′(w) = δ(λL+δ)h(w)
[δ+λL(1−H(w))]2 is upward sloping, which is difficult to reconcile with observed
wage distributions. In addition empirical studies point to the fact that this explanation
of wage dispersion, i.e. monopsony power of firms through frictions in connection with
on the job search is able to explain only a small part of the variance of an empirical
wage distribution [Bontemps et al., 2000, p.348f.].
A binding minimum wage does not affect unemployment as long as the marginal pro-
ductivity exceeds the minimum wage.14 Employers respond to an increase of a binding
minimum wage by raising their wage offers. This reduces the profit of the firms, but
12 This is the case, since otherwise the result cannot be an equilibrium. If profits were different for
different wages, then low-profit firms would have an incentive to change their paid wage, since by
assumption all firms are identical.
13 If the discount rate r is positive, the reservation wage formula can be generalized to wR =
(δ+λL)
2z+δ(λ+λL)yτ
(δ+λL)
2+δ(λ+λL)τ
, where τ = λL
δ
− 2 r
δ
+ 2 r(δ+r)
λLδ
ln
(
1 + λL
δ+r
)
[Bontemps et al., 2000, p.314].
14 Obviously, the same is true in the neo-classical model of the labor market. But if a minimum wage
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not labor demand since the profit is positive for each individual employed. Even more,
voluntary unemployment does not exist in this model. This result follows from the ho-
mogeneity assumption: each individual is a good allocation for each vacancy and vice
versa. This result holds as long as wages are below marginal productivity, a typical
result in search equilibrium models.
There is empirical evidence that indeed the unemployed accept every job offer, which
is a central result of the model above. Many studies estimate an acceptance proba-
bility of almost one: “Il apparaît que la première offre d’emploi reçue est pratiquement
toujours acceptée” Cahuc and Zylberberg [2001, p.77]; [see also Van den Berg, 1999,
p.F290]. But this means that the mechanism that explains voluntary unemployment
in the partial search model is not central for understanding unemployment. From this
point of view unemployment is involuntary.
An increase in the binding minimum wage alters the complete wage distribution. The
expectation of the wage distribution increases while the variance decreases. Unem-
ployment does not change. Clearly, a major drawback of this model is the homogene-
ity assumption, since it is likely that homogeneity is a critical assumption for the no
employment effects result. To see why, note that when reservation wages are het-
erogenous it is not more clear that firms offer wages that are above the reservation
wage of all individuals. On the other hand, note that Jolivet et al. [2006, p.1] con-
clude from an empirical implementation of the homogeneous search model in a cross
country comparison that the “(...) model fits the data surprisingly well”.
3 Heterogeneity
In reaction to the drawback of the homogeneity assumption, several extensions have
been discussed in the literature that introduce heterogeneity on either side of the mar-
ket. For individuals heterogeneity can take the form of different reservation wages
caused by differences in search costs or different productivities. For firms the effect of
different productivities has been examined.
3.1 Different search costs
This subsection presents a model extension that allows for different search costs
across unemployed job seekers [Burdett and Mortensen, 1998] since it is likely that
this extension has a major impact on the above results for the minimum wage. If un-
employed job seekers have different search costs a, then z varies conditional on b.15
is binding, there are always people whose marginal productivity is below this minimum wage, since
everybody is paid its marginal productivity. So, the central point is that, under the search-theoretic
perspective, people are not paid their marginal productivity, and therefore a binding minimum wage
does not necessarily mean higher unemployment.
15 Different search costs might arise when the access to labor markets is more different for one group
than for the other or when individuals have different preferences for leisure.
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First, notice that compared to the basic model different search costs have no effect on
labor demand. Because of identical productivity every (or no) match is profitable. But
there is an effect on offered and paid wages and therefore an effect on the behavior
of the job seekers. Intuitively, this is the case, since for firms in this case it might
be profitable to offer wages below the reservation wage of a part of the unemployed.
Provided that the offered wage is still above the reservation wage of some individuals,
a firm has still positive inflows. Then, for unemployed not every contact with a firm
means a profitable match. This is true, although the match is potentially profitable.
The resulting equilibrium wage distribution combines the effect of the informational
imperfection with the effect of the heterogeneity in search costs. On the one hand, the
wage distribution compensates the job seekers for its different search costs. On the
other hand, firms differ in size and they have to pay different wages to ensure their
size.
The model
Assumptions (B0), (B1”’), (B2), (B3), (B4’), (B5) and (B6) hold, where:
• (B1”’), as (B1”), but N individuals differ in their search costs. Their net search
costs z follow a continuous distribution on [z, z¯], where R(z) is the share of in-
dividuals whose search costs are below z. r(z) is the corresponding density. In
addition λL = λ holds.
• (B4’), as (B4), but firms know the distribution R(z), but cannot observe z individ-
ually.
Different reservation wage policies across individuals are a consequence of the as-
sumption of different net search costs. Note that (B1”’) implies that wR = z. Then,
equating in-and outflows to and from unemployment yields the equilibrium unemploy-
ment rate for any z-type. It is given by Uz =
δNr(z)
δ+λ[1−H(z)] .
The optimal behavior of the firm can be deduced as follows. The amount of unem-
ployed that accepts a wage offer w is given by:
S(w) =
∫ w
z
(
δNr(z)
δ + λ[1−H(z)]
)
dz =
∫ w
z
(
δN
δ + λ[1−H(z)]
)
dR(z). (12)
As before, let G(w) be the distribution of paid wages and L(w) = (N − S(z¯))G(w)
the amount of employees that are employed at a wage below w.16 Under stationarity,
employment must remain constant in firms that pay wages below w. Inflows to this
16 This is true, since S(∞) = S(z¯) is the amount of unemployed that would accept a wage offer of ∞.
Since all unemployed individuals would accept such a wage offer, S(z¯) is the amount of unemployed
over all z-types.
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group of firms stem only from unemployment. dS(z) unemployed z-individuals obtain
an acceptable job offer below w with probability H(w)−H(z). Thus, expected inflows
are λ
∫ w
z (H(w) − H(x))dS(x). Outflows are composed of job destruction δ and of
offers from better paying competitors λ(1 − H(w)) to employees in this wage group
(N − S(z¯))G(w). Taken together:
(δ + λ[1−H(w)])(N − S(z¯))G(w) = λ
∫ w
z
(H(w)−H(x))dS(x).
Solving for L(w) and differentiating with respect to w, after some simplifications17 the
equilibrium employment in a firm, offering the wage w is given by:
l(w) =
(N − S(z¯))G′(w)
h(w)
=
λδNR(w)
(δ + λ[1−H(w)])2 .
The wage offer distribution can be derived from the equality of profits Π = (y −w)l(w)
on the support of H(w) in equilibrium. Let w be the lower bound of the support, then
(y − w)λδNR(w)
(δ+λ)2
= (y − w) λδNR(w)
(δ+λ[1−H(w)])2 holds and it follows:
H(w) =
δ + λ
λ
[
1−
√
(y − w)R(w)
(y − w)R(w)
]
, für w ∈ [w,wo]. (13)
w is the biggest solution to w = arg maxw[(y − w)R(w)] and wo the biggest value that
satisfies (y−w¯)R(w¯)(y−w)R(w) =
δ2
(δ+λ)2
[Burdett and Mortensen, 1998, p.266].
Unemployed individuals in this extension of the basic model do not accept every wage
offer they obtain, and their expected unemployment duration depends on their reser-
vation wage. The resulting equilibrium unemployment S(z¯|H) is higher than the unem-
ployment that would result if all firms would pay a wage equal to marginal productivity
S(z¯|w = y).18 In addition equilibrium unemployment depends positively on δλ , an indi-
cator of the amount of frictions in the labor market. Assuming that z¯ < y and H(z¯) > 0,
every match is potentially profitable, but not every match is formed when employers
and employees meet. This is the case since firms commit ex-ante to pay some wage
of the wage offer distribution and since it is optimal for a part of the firms to offer wages
below z¯.
Introducing a binding minimum wage has several effects. It changes both the lower
bound of the wage distribution and the upper bound. However, since the minimum
wage shifts the wage offer distribution to the right and since the reservation wage
does not depend on the wage offer distribution for λL = λ, the average unemployment
17 L(w) is given by L(w) = G(w)(N − S(z¯)) = λ
∫w
z (H(w)−H(x))dS(x)
(δ+λ(1−H(w))) .
Using (12), dS(z) =
(
δN
δ+λ(1−H(z))
)
dR(z) and L′(w) = l(w)h(w) = (N − S(z¯))G′(w) the above l(w)
follows [Burdett and Mortensen, 1998, p.265].
18 That is always true as long as w < z¯.
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durations will decrease, since on average they obtain more acceptable wage offers;
that is unemployment decreases when the minimum wage increases. This is the case
since labor demand does not react, whereas job seekers accept job offers more often
on average. Still, one critique to this model is that it implies a counterfactual wage
density [Van den Berg, 1999, p.F299]. In addition, heterogeneity in workers or firms
productivities is likely to have quite different effects on employment effects of minimum
wages.
3.2 Heterogeneity across firms
A priori heterogeneity and endogenous wage dispersion
There exist several model extensions with exogenous or even endogenous, hetero-
geneous productivity in the search framework. In a competitive setting with constant
returns to scale this situation could not persist, since more productive firms would pay
higher wages and employees would move immediately to the better paying firm. In a
market with frictions however, this is not the case.
The following derivations are based upon Bontemps et al. [2000]. I will assume that
the assumptions (B0), (B1””), (B2), (B3), (B4”), (B5) and (B6’) hold, where:
• (B1””), as (B1”), but N identical individuals with productivity y˜ produce unequal
amounts y of the good C. y = y˜t(k) is assumed to hold, where t(·) is a positive
function of k and displays the following properties: t′(k) > 0, t′′(k) < 0. k can be
interpreted as capital intensity in a firm.
• (B4”), as (B4), but there is an amount of M firms, whose capital intensity is
distributed according to Γ(k) = Γ(y). The constant, exogenous random variable
K is drawn before production starts and has a finite expectation. There is a
unique realization of Y that corresponds to each realization of K. Realizations of
Y are continuously distributed on the support [y, y¯]. It is assumed that y exceeds
the common reservation wage of the employees or the binding minimum wage if
it exists.
• (B6’), as (B6), but the consumption good C is produced with labor and capital,
and there are no depreciations.
Equilibrium unemployment is given by equation (8) U = δNδ+λ . The reservation wage of
the U unemployed is given by equation (7) wR = z + (λ − λL)
∫ wo
wR
1−H(w)
r+δ+λL(1−H(w))dw,
where wo is the upper born of the wage distributions.
Describing the dynamics of employment in firms offering a wage above w (wR < w <
wo), imposing stationarity and using equation (8) helps us deducing equilibrium em-
ployment l(w) in firms offering w.
L(w)
N − U = G(w) =
U
(N − U)
λH(w)
[λL(1−H(w)) + δ] =
δH(w)
(λL(1−H(w)) + δ) , (14)
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as in the homogeneous model (equation 9). By the same arguments as above, the
reservation wage (or minimum wage) is the lower bound of the wage offer distribution
(see section 2.2). And thus:
l(w) = δ(N − U) δ + λL
[δ + λL(1−H(w))]2 . (15)
Note that l(w) must divide by M to obtain the average amount of employment in one
firm offering w: l˘(w) = l(w)M .
Firms maximize expected profits:
Π(w|y) = (y − w)l˘(w) = δ(y − w)(N − U)
M
(δ + λL)
[δ + λL(1−H(w))]2 . (16)
Again, the firm faces the trade-off between the profit per employee and the equilibrium
amount of employees. In general, the wage a firm pays can depend on its productivity
y. However, facing the results of section 2.2, note that it is possible that firms of an
identical y-type pay different wages if different wages yield identical profits. If this is
the case, then a firm of type y chooses a wage randomly according to H(w|y). Let
Ky = arg max
w
{Π(w|y)|max(wR, wmin) < w < y}
be the entity of profit maximizing wages from which the y-firm draws one. Then, in the
case of continuous productivity dispersion it can be shown that Ky = K(y) is unique
[Bontemps et al., 2000, p.315/350]. For each firm of a given y-type there is only one
optimal wage, which is increasing in y. This simplifies the analysis since then the
probability H(w) that a firm pays a wage lower than w = K(y) is determined by the
probability Γ(y) that the firm has a productivity below y. Since K(y) = w and since
K ′(y) > 0 the inverse y = K−1(w) can be calculated. The share of firms that offer
wages below w equals the share of firms, whose productivity is below y = K−1(w), or:
H(w) = Γ(K−1(w)).
The first order condition for the profit equation can be derived by differentiating (16)
with respect to w:
l˘′(w)
l˘(w)
=
l′(w)
l(w)
=
1
y − w , and (17)
−δ − λL(1−H(w)) + 2(y − w)λLh(w) = 0.
The first line follows from using the first equality and the second line from using the
second equality in equation (16). The second line determines the optimal wage for
each firm w = K(y|H(·)) implicitly for wages above the reservation wage.
For each firm equilibrium profits Π(·) and employment l˘(·) can be obtained as a func-
tion of y. Using this, an explicit expression for K(y) can be obtained. y-firms make
profits of Π(y) = (y − K(y))l˘(K(y)). Differentiating with respect to y yields Π′(y) =
(1−K ′(y))l˘(K(y)) + (y−K(y))l˘′(K(y))K ′(y). Using optimality and the envelope the-
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orem, the following result is obtained:
Π′(y) = l˘(K(y)). (18)
Thus, profits of the firms are increasing with productivity. Integrating equation (18)
yields an explicit expression for Π(y) (see appendix 5.3). Using this and a suitable
form of the equilibrium employment equation, I obtain the following expression for
K(y):
K(y) = y − [δ + λL(1− Γ(y))]2
∫ y
w
1
[δ + λL(1− Γ(%))]2d%, (19)
where w = max(wR, wmin).
The wage offer distribution follows from H(w) = Γ(K−1(w)). But, in general there is
no closed form expression K−1(w).
The equilibrium wage offer distribution H(w) = Γ(K−1(w)) uniquely determines the
distribution of paid wages G(w) in equation (14). It also determines the equilibrium
profit of firms Π(w|y) in (16) depending on y. Profit is maximized if firms choose the
wage according to equation (19) and is given by equation (38). Equilibrium unemploy-
ment is given by equation (8).
Wage dispersion in this model arises as a result of the interaction of both search fric-
tions and productivity dispersion. Productivity dispersion itself is not sufficient for wage
dispersion. It has been shown above, however, that informational frictions alone with
on-the-job search are a sufficient condition for wage dispersion. However, first, the
integration of different productivities across firms is an important ingredient, empiri-
cally. Second, it has been mentioned before that the homogeneous model implies
counterfactual wage distributions and it is only able to explain part of the variance of
wages between individuals. In this context, the resulting wage distributions depend on
the productivity distribution. If for example a Pareto-distribution for the productivity is
assumed, a realistic shape for the wage distribution can be obtained [Bontemps et al.,
2000]. Indeed, the model is able to generate wage distributions that are in accordance
with the data. This is astonishing, especially since the assumption of homogeneous
workers has been retained.
Since K ′(y) > 0, an increasing variance of the distribution of the productivities, in-
creases the variance of the wage distribution, whereas equilibrium unemployment re-
mains unchanged. A minimum wage affects both the lower and the upper bound of
the wage distribution. As in the homogeneous model, equilibrium unemployment is in
general not affected while the monopsony power of the firms is affected. Rents can be
redistributed from firms to workers. Although, in general, an increasing minimum wage
drives unproductive firms out of the market, labor demand does not react, because the
missing demand of the low productive firms is fully compensated by their more produc-
tive counterparts. However, the assumption that there is always a continuum of firms
that demands labor is critical in that context. The fact that firms are driven out of the
market stipulates another point, namely that a minimum wage has dynamic effects on
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the composition of the firms. This aspect is however beyond the scope of this paper.
3.3 Heterogeneity on both sides of the market
If trying to explain the variance of paid wages between observationally equivalent
workers, basically two components are required: first, there are firm effects on the
wage and, second, there is an effect of the degree of frictions on wages. In addi-
tion, wages vary considerably between workers with different observed characteris-
tics, controlling for firm characteristics and search frictions. Summing up, three factors
are needed to explain empirical wage distributions: heterogeneous firms, heteroge-
neous workers and search frictions [see Bontemps et al., 2000, Abowd et al., 1999].
So far, the presented models explain wage variation by search frictions [Burdett and
Mortensen, 1998], by search frictions and heterogeneity of the employees [Burdett and
Mortensen, 1998], by search frictions and exogenous technology differences [Bon-
temps et al., 2000]. The model presented in this section integrates the three important
factors for the explanation of an empirical wage distribution. The model is due to
Postel-Vinay and Robin [2002a].
Assumptions
Heterogenous productivity of the individuals is integrated in the model in the following
way. Consider the labor market for a specific homogeneous professional group, where
all homogenous job seekers are substitutable to a certain degree. However, individu-
als differ in their productivity as measured by an index ε. Individuals determine their
productivity by drawing a value from the continuous productivity distribution Ω(ε) on
an interval [εmin, εmax] with density ω(ε). It is assumed that unemployed job seekers
of type ε obtain a net unemployment income of z(ε) = εb. w brings the individual the
utility Ξ(w) and individuals maximize the present value of their expected utility over an
infinite time horizon. Leisure does not enter the utility function of the individuals.
Each firm produces with technology y which is distributed according to a cdf Γ(y) with
density γ(y) on a bounded support [y, y¯] and which is determined by an ex-ante ran-
dom draw. A firm maximizes the present value of its expected profits over an infinite
time horizon. It is assumed that the “home productivity” b exceeds y. Marginal produc-
tivity of an efficiency unit of labor is constant given the y-type of the firm. That is, an
individual of type ε and a firm of type y produce together an output yε, a production
function with homogeneity degree of 2.
The sequential process of contacts between employers and employees is as follows.
Unemployed job seekers contact firms at rate λ, while employed job seekers contact
firms at λL. It is assumed that each firm of type y makes wage offers to individuals
with a specific probability that is identical over all ε-types. The contact probability for
a type-y firm follows a distribution function Ψ(y) with density ψ(y). Postel-Vinay and
Robin [2002a] argue that the relative frequency of contacts for a y-firm ψ(y)/γ(y) is
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determined by the search intensity of this firm. There is, however, no microfoundation
for the ratio of ψ(y) and γ(y).
Upon a meeting, both sides have complete information about all relevant characteris-
tics of the other side. Therefore, the wage offer of the firm can condition on the type
ε of the job seeker. In addition, if an employee gets an outside job offer from a com-
peting firm, the employing firm can make a binding counteroffer. Implications of this
assumption are detailed in Postel-Vinay and Robin [2002b]. In a model with endoge-
nous technology dispersion, they show that job-to-job transitions depend basically on
the productivities of the competing firms. Before discussing their derivations, assump-
tions (B0), (B1””’), (B2), (B3’), (B4”’), (B5’) and (B6”) summarize the foundation of the
model:
• (B1””’), as (B1’), but N individuals maximize their utility function Ξ(w) and en-
ter and leave the labor market at rate n. Newcomer enter the labor market as
unemployed job seekers. Individuals differ in their productivity ε , according to a
distribution function Ω(ε) on [εmin, εmax]. ε-type unemployed obtain z = εb. WU (·)
(WL(·)) are the values of unemployment and employment, respectively. When
a job seeker and a firm meet, the probability that the productivity of the firm is
below y is Ψ(y).
• (B3’), as (B3), but matches dissolve at rate δ + n , where δ is the job destruction
rate and n is the rate at which individuals leave (and enter) the market.
• (B4”’), as (B4), but firms differ in their productivity y, distributed according to Γ(y)
on [y, y¯], with y > b. Upon a meeting the firm observes both the type ε and the
productivity y of the firm that employs the individual at present.
• (B5’), as (B5) but firms condition their wage offer w(ε, y, ·) that is nonnegotiable
on the type ε of the individual and on the productivity y of the firm that employs
the individual so far.
• (B6”): Specific labor market, where r is the discount rate in this market and
where a homogeneous product is produced from heterogeneous agents. A type
y firm and a type ε individual produce together the output yε of the homogeneous
good. The price of the produced good is the numéraire.
The model
Let WU (ε, b, εb) = WU (ε) be the value of unemployment of an individual of type ε
and let WL(ε, y, w) be the value of employment of the same ε-type, depending on the
productivity of the employing firm and the paid wage. The value equation depends
not only on the wage that the firm pays but also on the productivity of this firm. This
is the case, since the productivity of the firm determines the career opportunities (in
the sense of potential wage gains) in this firm. If an employed individual of type ε
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obtains a wage offer from a competing firm, the upper bound of the wage increase
for the individual is determined by the productivity of the employing firm. To see this,
notice that the maximal counteroffer that the employing firm can make is bound by its
productivity. However, because of perfect information, the competing firm will choose
its wage offer such that the individual is indifferent between changing the firm and
not. Job seekers obtain always exactly their reservation wage upon engagement.
For unemployed job seekers, it can be calculated from WL(ε, y, wR) = WU (ε), where
wR = wR(ε, y, z) = wR(ε, y). The reservation wage of the unemployed job seekers,
like the reservation wage of employed job seekers depends on the career opportunities
in the firm, that makes the offer.
If a y′-firm with y′ > y makes an offer, it chooses the wage such that the individual is
indifferent between the value of the highest wage w = εy he can get in his firm without
career opportunities19, and the value of the wage with the positive career opportunities
if changing to the y′-firm. Let ww(ε, y, y′) be the wage that makes the ε–individual
indifferent between the firms y, y′. Then: WL(ε, y, εy) = WL(ε, y′, ww). If the competing
firm has a lower productivity than the employing firm y′ < y, than the firm is ready to
pay at most εy′. The counteroffer that is able to inhibit the individual from changing
the firm is because of the better career opportunities smaller than εy′ and given by
ww(ε, y′, y), where WL(ε, y, ww) = WL(ε, y′, εy′) holds.
The value of unemployment can be derived as usual from the no-arbitrage condi-
tion, where the instantaneous income has to be replaced by the instantaneous util-
ity Ξ(εb). The value of a job offer is given by the value of unemployment since
firms offer exactly the reservation wage to the individual. Future utility flows are
discounted by the discount rate r plus the instantaneous mortality rate n. It follows
WU (ε) = 11+(r+n)dt{Ξ(εb)dt+ λdtWU (ε) + (1− λdt)WU (ε)}, or:
WU (ε) =
Ξ(εb)
r + n
.
The value of employment contains several components. If an ε-individual that is em-
ployed at wage w in a y-firm obtains an offer from a competing firm, three possibilities
arise. First, if the productivity y′ from the competing firm is so small that the employing
firm could poach the ε-employee from the y′-firm for a wage ww(ε, y′, y) < w, nothing
changes. Let the critical productivity of a competing firm for which ww(ε, yˇ, y) = w
holds, be yˇ(ε, y, w). Than the probability that the offer does not change anything is
given by Ψ(yˇ). The second possibility is that yˇ < y′ < y. That is, the competing firm
cannot win the Bertrand-competition, but is able to offer the employee a higher value
than it has in the current firm with his current wage. That is, the employee gets the
wage increase ww(ε, y′, y) − w and his new value of work is given by WL(ε, y′, εy′).
This happens with probability Ψ(y) − Ψ(yˇ). The value equation must account for the
expected value of labor over the productivities of the competing firms in this case.
Finally, if the productivity of the competing firm y′ is higher as the productivity of the
19 Without career opportunities means that the employing firm pays marginal productivity and can there-
fore offer no higher wage.
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employing firm y it wins the Bertrand-competition, the employee changes the firm and
its wage changes by the amount ww(ε, y, y′)−w.20 With the corresponding probability
(1 − Ψ(y)) his new value of work is then WL(ε, y′, ww(·)) = WL(ε, y, εy). The value
equation summarizes these possibilities:
[r + δ + n+ λL(1−Ψ(yˇ(·)))]WL(ε, y, w) = Ξ(w) + δWU (ε) + (20)
λL[Ψ(y)−Ψ(yˇ(·))]EΨ[WL(ε, x, εx)|yˇ < x < y] + λL(1−Ψ(y))WL(ε, y, εy).
Evaluating this formula at w = εy, I find that:
WL(ε, y, εy) =
Ξ(εy) + δWU (ε)
r + δ + n
. (21)
This is true, since yˇ(ε, y, εy) = y. Using (21) for the conditional expectation in (20)
together with the conditional distribution Ψ(x|yˇ < x < y) = Ψ(x)Ψ(y)−Ψ(yˇ) , using in addi-
tion integration by parts, the fact that WL(ε, y, w) = WL(ε, yˇ, εyˇ) and the relationship
λL
(
Ξ(εy)−Ξ(εyˇ)
r+δ+n
)
= λLεr+δ+n
∫ y
yˇ Ξ
′(εx)dx, a new expression for the value of work is ob-
tained.
(r + δ + n)WL(ε, y, w) = Ξ(w) + δWU (ε) +
λLε
r + δ + n
∫ y
yˇ
(1−Ψ(x))Ξ′(εx)dx (22)
The return to working at wage w can be decomposed in the instantaneous utility of the
wage minus the loss in case where the job gets lost −(δ(WL(·)−WU (·))+nWL(·)) plus
the instantaneous probability to get an offer of a competing firm times the expected
discounted utility gain in this case.21 Using that by definition WL(ε, y, w) = WL(ε, yˇ, εyˇ)
and equation (21) on the left hand side of equation (22), Ξ(w) = Ξ(εyˇ)− λLεr+δ+n
∫ y
yˇ (1−
Ψ(x))Ξ′(εx)dx is obtained. If a firm with y′ > y makes an offer to an employee, then
the employee changes the firm and obtains the wage ww(ε, y, y′). Plugging this in the
last formula and using that yˇ(ε, y′, ww(·)) = y, one obtains an implicit characterization
of the wage an individual obtains when changing job.
Ξ(ww(ε, y, y′)) = Ξ(εy)− λLε
r + δ + n
∫ y′
y
(1−Ψ(x))Ξ′(εx)dx (23)
Analogously, the reservation wage of an unemployed job seeker when obtaining an
offer from a y′-firm (y′ > b) is given implicitly by using wR(ε, b, y′) = ww(ε, b, y′) and
20 The wage change can be both a wage increase and a wage cut. This depends on the wage the
employee has earned in the old firm and on the productivities of both firms. If for example the employee
earns already marginal productivity in his firm, the wage change is always a wage cut.
21 The expected utility gain from a job offer can be calculated as the integral over the probability that the
offer stems from a firm, whose productivity is above x, where x ∈ [yˇ, y], times the marginal utility of
the highest wage xε this firm can afford to pay. Putting ε
r+δ+n
under the integral, the integral is the
expected discounted utility gain from a wage offer of a firm with productivity y′ ∈ [yˇ, y]. This is true
since all firms with productivity above x ∈ [yˇ, y] can afford to pay at least wage xε and therefore insures
at least marginal utility Ξ′(εx) for the individual and since for values x > y the value of employment
remains unchanged.
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yˇ(ε, y′, wR(·)) = b.
Ξ(wR(ε, b, y′)) = Ξ(εb)− λLε
r + δ + n
∫ y′
b
(1−Ψ(x))Ξ′(εx)dx (24)
Both wages are reservation wages in the sense that they correspond to the minimum
wage offer that a type y′-firm must make a ε-individual to induce it to work in this
firm. In both cases this reservation wage depends on the current productivity, either
of the employing firm or the home productivity. Since a firm with y′ > y offers career
opportunities, the wage ww(·) it pays is lower than the maximal wage a y-firm can
afford. The discounted value of the career opportunities is given by the second addend
in equation (23). Thus, the model generates voluntary job-to-job transitions under
wage cuts. The analog holds for the reservation wage of the unemployed, it is lower
than the value of their home production.
Paid wages are either the first wage wR(ε, b, y′) or a wage that results from a Bertrand-
competition between two firms y, y′, that is ww(ε, y′, y) mit yˇ < y′ < y (or ww(ε, y, y′), if
y′ > y). So there are always three components contained in the wage: individual pro-
ductivity, firm productivity and luck. For a CRRA-utility function (as e.g. Ξ(w) = lnw)
the reservation wage from equation (23) can be decomposed additively in its three
components, i.e. lnww(ε, y, y′) = ln ε + lnww(1, y, y′) = ln ε + ln y + λLr+δ+n
∫ y′
y
1
x(1 −
Ψ(x))dx (ibid., p.2305). From this the decomposition of the variance of paid wages
can be derived from which the model has been motivated (see appendix 5.4).
varw(lnw) = varε(ln ε) + vary[E(y′|y)(lnww(1, y, y′)|y)] +Ey[var(y′|y)(lnww(1, y, y′)|y)]
The variance of wages can be decomposed in a component that is attributable to
individual productivity differences (ε), a component that comes from different firm pro-
ductivities (y) and in a component that comes from labor market frictions (see also
appendix 5.4).
Before characterizing the equilibrium, some additional definitions must be made. Let
L(ε, y) be the share of individuals whose productivity is below ε and that are employed
in firms with productivity below y. Then, Ly(y) =
∫ εmax
εmin
L(ε, y)dε is the share of individ-
uals that are employed in firms with productivity below y. Let l(ε, y) and ly(y) be the
corresponding densities. Further let G(w|ε, y) be the conditional distribution of paid
wages. Equilibrium unemployment follows from λu = (1− u)(δ + n), or
u =
δ + n
λ+ δ + n
. (25)
This is the usual condition for unemployment, accounting however for the fact that
there is turnover in the population.
The conditional wage distribution in equilibrium is characterized by the following. There
are G(w|ε, y)l(ε, y)N(1−u) employees of type ε, who are employed in a type y-firm at
wage below w. Employees of this category leave the class either because of job de-
struction δ, because of death n, or because they obtain an offer from a firm, whose pro-
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ductivity is above yˇ(·). So, outflows amount to (δ+n+λL(1−Ψ(yˇ)))G(w|ε, y)l(ε, y)N(1−
u). Inflows come from the pool of unemployed λψ(y)ω(ε), since firms offer the reserva-
tion wage, which is always acceptable to the individuals.22 On the other hand, y-firms
can poach ε-individuals to a wage below w from firms, whose productivity is below
yˇ(ε, y, w). The expected flow is given by λLN(1− u)ψ(y)
∫ yˇ(ε,y,w)
y l(ε, x)dx. In equilib-
rium, using equation (25) and canceling out N(1− u), it follows:
(δ + n+ λL(1−Ψ(yˇ)))G(w|ε, y)l(ε, y) =
[
(δ + n)ω(ε) + λL
∫ yˇ(ε,y,w)
y
l(ε, x)dx
]
ψ(y).
(26)
Evaluating this equality at w = εy, and using that G(εy|ε, y) = 1 and yˇ(ε, y, w) = y,
(δ + n + λL(1 − Ψ(y)))l(ε, y) =
[
(δ + n)ω(ε) + λL
∫ y
y l(ε, x)dx
]
ψ(y) is obtained. The
solution to this differential equation is (ibid., p.2341):
l(ε, y) =
(1 + κL)ψ(y)
[1 + κL(1−Ψ(y))]2ω(ε) = ly(y)ω(ε), with κL =
λL
δ + n
. (27)
Using the primitive L(ε, y) = Ψ(y)1+κL(1−Ψ(y))Ω(ε) = Ly(y)Ω(ε) and l(ε, y) this is easily
checked. Equation (27) basically says, that the employment of type ε individuals is
independent of the type y of the firm, i.e., there is no sorting.
Using (27), equation (26) can be solved for G(w|ε, y). The conditional distribution of
wages for ε-individuals in y-firms is given by:
G(w|ε, y) =
(
1 + κL(1−Ψ(y))
1 + κL(1−Ψ(yˇ(ε, y, w)))
)2
. (28)
The equilibrium size of a y-firm can be derived by the equilibrium conditions asN ly(y)γ(y) =
N(1+κL)
[1+κL(1−Ψ(y))]2
ψ(y)
γ(y) . The first term implies that the size of a firm increases with the pro-
ductivity of the firm, since upon meetings they are more often capable of attracting
individuals from competing firms than low productivity firms. The second term reflects
by assumption the search intensity of a firm, which can increase or decrease with firm
productivity. So, firm size does not uniquely depend on productivity. Since the random
variable ε does not depend on the random vector (y, y′) and since this implies indepen-
dence between ε and y, the conditional distribution of (y′|y) can be derived. Let y′ < y,
then G(ww(ε, y, y′)|ε, y) = G(εy′|ε, y) = Ω(ε)G˘(y,y
′)
Ω(ε)Ly(y)
= G˜(y′|y) =
(
1+κL(1−Ψ(y))
1+κL(1−Ψ(y′))
)2
. This
is true since yˇ(ε, y′, ww) = y′.
Summarizing, it is to be noticed that the model is able to integrate the three factors that
are empirically important for explaining wage dispersion into a theoretical framework.
An attractive feature of the model is that it provides a rationale for voluntary job-to-job
transitions under wage cuts, since this seems to be a phenomenon that is empiri-
cally important [for Germany, see Fitzenberger and Garloff, 2007, Pfeiffer, 2003]. On
the other hand, (real) wage cuts for job stayers seem to be empirically important, too
[Postel-Vinay and Robin, 2002a, Pfeiffer, 2003, p.2313f.,p.40ff.]. Of course, this cannot
22 This is true because of the assumption y > b.
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be explained by the model. A further interesting result is that ε and y are distributed
independently, which implies that there is no sorting within professional groups. This
is implied by equation (27).23 Although it is true that more productive firms prefer em-
ploying more productive individuals and although they can attract them if competing
with low productive firms, firms can earn positive profits for each employee. Therefore
in the model, they employ everybody and in equilibrium there is no sorting. The limita-
tion to professional groups is important, since there is evidence for positive assortative
matching in labor markets [Van den Berg and Van Vuuren, 2006].
Now, introducing a binding minimum wage has multiple effects. Assume that wmin >
yεmin. There is a set of matches that are not profitable anymore and they are not
performed. For workers with productivity εcrit < wminy , i.e. workers that are affected by
the minimum wage, the specific unemployment rate is higher. However, those workers
that are still employed, earn higher wages. Let ycrit = wminεmin denote the productivity
boundary, above which all matches are profitable. Then firms with y < ycrit have
less employees and make lower profits than in the absence of the minimum wage.
For all other firms there is a number of matches that are in fact profitable, but which
require the firms to pay the obligatory minimum wage instead of the reservation wage.
This reduces profits of the firms but leads to higher average wages for the employees.
Summarizing, in this model, the effects of a binding minimum wage on employment is
negative, while rents are distributed from firms to workers.
3.4 Production functions and marginal productivity
So far, the models discussed allow for differences both on the side of the firms and
on the side of the individuals. They maintain, however, the assumption that the pro-
ductivity of an individual does not depend on the number of individuals employed.
Yet, another possibility to introduce heterogeneity is the assumption of non-constant
marginal productivities. Again, this difference is likely to be crucial for the effects of
minimum wages on wages and employment. Spill-over effects between different skill-
groups might become relevant. So far, there are only little attempts in the literature
to incorporate this production function view in the search framework. One such at-
tempt is Ridder and Van den Berg [1997], which draws on Manning [1993], Mortensen
and Vishwanath [1993] and Mortensen and Vishwanath [1994]. This model assumes
a non-linear production function with one production factor, only. Introducing several
skill groups and linking them over a production function is analytically very demand-
ing. There are not many models performing such a task. One such model with several
production factors linked over a production function will be discussed below and is due
to Holzner and Launov [2005].
I start by discussing the model where one production factor is allowed to have non-
constant marginal productivity in a production function, depending on its use. For the
23 Note, that since there is no assumption concerning the distribution of the individuals across firms, this
is a result of the model and not an assumption. Other papers using similar frameworks conclude on
the contrary that there is positive assortative matching. [see, e.g. Gautier et al., 2005]
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presentation, I refer to Ridder and Van den Berg [1997]. Consider the framework as
outlined in 2.2. As before, let l(w) be the steady-state number of individuals employed
in a firm that pay a wage w, and let y(l(w)) denote the output depending on the em-
ployment l(w).24 Assume that y is concave [y′(l) > 0, y′′(l) < 0] and that y(0) = 0.
Assume, in addition, that the job offer rate off-the-job and on-the-job are identical
λ = λL.
The reservation wage is given by equation (7) and reduces to the monetary value
of obtaining unemployment benefits net of search costs, because the option value of
unemployment vanishes through the equality of job offer rates, i.e. wR = z. Equilibrium
unemployment is unchanged and follows from the steady-state condition for inflows
into and outflows from unemployment u = δδ+λ since firms do not offer wages below
the reservation wage. The objective function of the firms25 is given by
pi(w) = y(l(w))− wl(w). (29)
Concavity of y implies that there is a size l(w) where y′(l(w)) ≤ w. This implies
that, at the upper bound of the wage distribution, a mass point can be obtained. In
this case it is present both in the wage offer distribution H(w) and in the distribution
of paid wages G(w). It arises since at the employment level where the wage equals
marginal productivity every additional worker (even when obtained at that wage) would
contribute a negative amount to the objective function and thus there is no incentive
to pay a higher wage.26 Still, firms paying a marginal productivity wage make positive
profits because of the concavity.
Depending on the parameters this model has several possible solutions. One solution
is an equilibrium where all firms pay a common wage, which can be either equal to
the reservation wage or equal to marginal productivity and guarantees employment
Nλ
λ+δ .
27 The reservation wage solution is obtained if marginal productivity in the sym-
metric equilibrium is below or equal to z, i.e. y′( Nλλ+δ ) ≤ z. In this case, it does not pay
to deviate: paying a lower wage guarantees zero employees, whereas paying a higher
wage increases the number of employees thereby decreasing marginal productivity.
This makes the contribution of a an additional worker negative. So, deviating does not
pay and this is an equilibrium if profits are positive. Otherwise, there is no production.
A dispersed equilibrium cannot exist in this case. To see this, recognize that for em-
ployment to be positive all wages must be above or equal to z. However, assume that
z was the upper bound of the wage distribution (if it is higher, profits are even lower).
Employment in the continuous part of the wage distribution is given by equation (10).
Employment at the upper bound of the wage distribution is higher than in the equal
24 Note, that here y is uniquely determined by the employment of the firm. Given employment y is no
random variable.
25 It is to be noted that the objective function given here is not equal to the expected profit because
of the non-linearity of the production function. It can be justified, however, by a second order Taylor
approximation [Holzner and Launov, 2005].
26 The incentive to pay a higher wage is the reason why mass points cannot exist in the homogeneous
model. This mechanism is destroyed by decreasing marginal productivity.
27 The equal wage employment is given by the employment rate times the number of employees N
divided by the number of firms 1.
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wages equilibrium l(wo) = Nλδ >
Nλ
λ+δ . Thus marginal productivity is strictly lower than
z. Firms paying wage z want to shrink. Thus, there is no such equilibrium.
Similarly, unique equilibria with dispersed wages or partly dispersed wages are ob-
tained under the following parameter constellations. If the profit at z for a dispersed
equilibrium is higher than the profit at a common wage equilibrium (which equals
marginal productivity) w¯ = y′( Nλλ+δ ) > z, then an equilibrium with dispersed wages
is obtained, since deviating from the common wage to the reservation wage pays di-
rectly. Otherwise if
y
(
Nλ
δ + λ
)
− w¯ Nλ
δ + λ
> y
(
Nδλ
(δ + λ)2
)
− z Nδλ
(δ + λ)2
(30)
the common wage equilibrium is obtained, since deviating does not pay (neither below,
nor above).
Now, consider the dispersed equilibrium. Still, it is possible that there is a both a
dispersed part and a mass point having a probability mass γ = Prob(w = w¯) <
1. Steady-state employment in these firms can be calculated by equating in- and
outflows.28
λ(N − γl(w¯)) = δl(w¯) (31)
This yields l(w¯) = Nλδ+λγ as employment in one firm that offers the wage at the mass
point. Clearly, the wage at the mass point must correspond to the marginal productivity
given the employment, i.e. y′( Nλδ+λγ ) = w¯.
29 Paying the mass point or being in the
continuous part must yield identical profits and thus:
y
(
Nδλ
(δ + λ)2
)
− z Nδλ
(δ + λ)2
= y
(
Nλ
δ + λγ
)
− y′
(
Nλ
δ + λγ
)
Nλ
δ + λγ
. (32)
If there is a value between 0 and 1 for γ that solves this equation, then a mass point is
obtained. Otherwise there is no mass point in the wage distribution.
For the general case (unspecified production), it is not possible to obtain a closed form
solution for H and G. Note however, that the counterfactual shape of the wage density
does not get lost. On the contrary, to compensate for the decreasing profit per worker
because of a decreasing marginal productivity, employment must grow even faster with
the wage than in the linear model.30 Then, equation (10) implies that the density is
even steeper.
Increasing minimum wages might change the equilibrium obtained and compress the
28 The equation can be derived by recognizing, that l(w¯) per assumption is the employment in one firm
that offers w¯ and that the measure of firms is 1.
29 If the wage was higher, firms would want to employ less. If the wage was lower, the usual argument
that increasing the wage by a small amount increases profits holds.
30 With decreasing marginal productivity, there are two effects that drive the profit per worker down,
when employment is growing: first, to attract more worker the wage must increase and even with
linear production the profit per worker decreases. Second, with increasing employment the marginal
productivity decreases, driving down the other component of the profit per worker.
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wage distribution. The probability of obtaining a mass point at the upper bound of the
wage distribution increases. In general, however this does not result in lower employ-
ment, since all equilibria but one yield the same employment. If minimum wages have
employment effects however, that means shifting from an equilibrium with production
to an equilibrium where there is no production at all. Clearly, this is not a very realistic
possibility.
An extension of the baseline model to a production function with several skill groups
i each of size qi with
∑
qi = N and heterogeneous production technologies as in-
dexed by j is due to Holzner and Launov [2005]. Note, that this is the most general
model discussed in this paper: it allows for differences between firms employing dif-
ferent technologies and for differences in workers that vary in productivity a priori and
depending on their use. Let me introduce some notation, first. wij is the wage offer
a firm of type j offers to an individual of type i. Let Hij be the wage offer distribution
for firms that produce with a technology j for skill group i. I.e., Hij(wij) is the amount
of type-j firms that offers a wage below wij for type-i individuals. Hi is the wage offer
distribution for skill group i aggregated over all firm types, i.e. the distribution individ-
uals care about, when looking for a job. Finally, Hj is the I-dimensional wage offer
distribution of type-j firms to all skill groups. Similarly, li(wij) gives the employment of
skill group i in a type j firm that offers wij , while l(wj) is the I-dimensional employment
of all skill groups in this firm.
The reservation wage wRi for individuals of skill group i is given by equation (7) and is
indexed by i. Skill-specific unemployment is given by equality of in- and outflows and
determined by the skill-specific friction parameter λi.31 In addition, the dynamics for
each skill group is similar as in the standard model, meaning that equation (10) holds
for each skill group, indexed by the index i, except for the following modification. In the
denominator (δ+λL(1−H(w)))2 must be replaced by (δ+λL(1−Hi(wi)))(δ+λL(1−
Hi(w−i ))). The modification follows from the fact that Hi is allowed to contain mass
points and thus Hi(wi) = Hi(w−i ) + γi(wi). If there are no mass points, the original
employment equation is obtained. Recognize that λL, δ are assumed identical across
skill groups.
Firms with production technology j maximize their expected profit by choosing the
wage vector wj = (w1j , w2j , ..., wIj), j = 1, ..., J i.e.:
pij = max
wj
E[yj(l(wj))− w′jl(wj)]. (33)
Using a second order Taylor-Approximation, E[yj(l(wj)) − w′jl(wj)] can be rewritten
as yj(E(l(wj)))−w′jE(l(wj)). Note that, due to tractability reasons, it is assumed that
firms do not react on short-run variations in employment, implying that firms spec-
ify their wage policy at the outset and do not change it. Holzner and Launov [2005]
assume complementarity between the production factors (supermodularity) in the pro-
31 Firms do not offer wages below the reservation wage of the individuals. This can be justified by
assuming for the production function that each skill is essential in production and is implied by the
supermodularity assumption made below.
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duction function yj . This guarantees, provided a continuous distribution, that (type
j) firms cover exactly the same position in the wage offer distribution of each skill
group.32 As above, if there exists a mass point, it exists at the upper bound w¯ij of the
skill-specific wage distribution Hij for firms with technology j. At this point, marginal
productivity given the employment at that wage equals the wage y′j(lij(wij)) = wij .
It is assumed that firms profits differ according to the technology j employed. In this
case, firms sort according to their profitabilities in the skill-specific wage offer distribu-
tions meaning that more profitable firms pay higher wages. Thus, the share of firms
that offers wages below the upper bound w¯ij of a skill-specific wage offer distribution
of firms of type j equals the share of firms sj with technology j and less profitable
Hij(w¯ij) = sj . The resulting skill-specific wage offer distributions Hi have no holes
(connected support) and the reservation wage (of skill group i) is the lower bound of
the wage offer distribution (of skill group i) as in the standard model. Excluding mass
points, Holzner and Launov [2005] are able to derive an analytical form for the wage
offer distribution. They show that depending on the degree of homogeneity of the pro-
duction function, the model is able to generate increasing or decreasing skill-specific
wage offer densities hij .33 That means that they do not require differences in technolo-
gies to generate a well-shaped wage density, as opposed to the models discussed so
far. In addition, they show that for higher wages decreasing densities are more likely.
Introducing a binding minimum wage has the following effects. Assume that a binding
minimum wage is introduced for one skill group only. This compresses the wage dis-
tribution for this skill group from the left. In addition, the complete skill-specific wage
distribution Hi is shifted to the right. This follows from the fact that the upper bound
of the skill specific wage offer distributions w¯ij for each technology j depends posi-
tively on the lower bound. As long as the skill-specific wage offer distribution does
not contain a mass point, the other wage offer distributions remain unchanged and
firms still cover the same position in the wage distributions for each skill group. It is
possible however, that the increase of the binding minimum wage leads to a mass
point. Increasing the minimum wage above marginal productivity of the most unprof-
itable technology would make it optimal for the firms to employ less individuals. This is
however not allowed for by the model. It is possible that the minimum wage increases
to a level where firms with the most unprofitable technology make negative profits and
thus are driven out of the market.
Independently of the precise effects on the wage distribution, employment effects of
increasing a minimum wage are zero, since labor demand as represented by λi does
not react, even when firms go bankrupt. The reason is that λi does not depend on the
32 Intuitively this is the case, since under supermodularity in production a firm that has high employment
in each skill group and a firm that has low employment in each skill group together produce more
output than any two firms that produce with any other combination of these amounts. Notice that this
characteristic carries over to the profits of the firms.
33 Intuitively, with increasing returns to scale there is a factor which counteracts the effect of decreasing
profits per employee from the standard model. To insure constant profits, this implies that employment
must grow more slowly as compared to the linear production case. A decreasing wage offer density
guarantees employment growth to be slowly.
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measure of active firms nor does it depend on the profitability of the use of a specific
skill group (as long as the productivity of this skill group is high enough to guarantee
some employment). Thus, the minimum wage redistributes rents from firms to workers
and might eliminate unprofitable technologies but does not increase unemployment.
Introducing a binding minimum wage for all skill groups simultaneously is similar in its
effects, with the modification that the point where a technology becomes unprofitable
is attained faster.
Note that the existence of mass points in the wage distribution makes it reasonable
to think about rationing of jobs [Ridder and Van den Berg, 1997], because there are
cases where profits at the mass point are higher with lower employment. The model
of Holzner and Launov [2005] does not account for this possibility which must be seen
as a drawback.
4 Conclusion
The aim of this paper is twofold. On the one hand, it presents models of the labor
market that give ample consideration to the frictional character of the labor market. A
number of models that explicitly take account of the incompleteness of information and
the process of acquiring information are introduced. In the basic model, an equilibrium
wage distribution is derived for ex-ante homogeneous employees and employers. In
extensions to the model, the impact of differences on the employer and employee sides
on the resulting equilibrium wage distribution are examined. Because heterogeneity
of the actors in the labor market is seen as an important factor, it is sensible to study
models that explicitly model heterogeneity on both market sides and that are still ana-
lytically tractable. All these equilibrium search models are seen to be able to generate
residual wage dispersion, which is an important component of wage dispersion as a
whole [see, e.g. Juhn et al., 1993, Katz and Autor, 1999, Lemieux, 2006]. Thus, these
models contribute to our understanding of wage inequality and its changes.
Recently, the possibility to implement minimum wages in Germany has been extended
dramatically in Germany. In addition, the scientific debate about employment effects
of minimum wages in Germany has obtained new impulses by the paper of König
and Möller [2007].34 So, the second aim of this paper was to discuss the impact of
minimum wages on employment and realized wages under this frictional setting. It
turns out that the compression hypothesis, i.e. the assumption that institutional wage
compression leads to higher unemployment, is not supported by all models analyzed.
I obtain all sorts of employment effects: positive, zero, and negative ones. For ex-
ample, in the case of continuous search costs, a minimum wage can even lead to a
reduction of unemployment. The mechanism is that individuals in this case find more
wage offers acceptable. Where I obtain zero employment effects this stems from the
34 So far, the conclusion in the international literature on employment effects of minimum wages is mixed
depending on the country, the extent of the minimum wage, the age group and the industry for which
it holds. But all in all, the literature seems to be a bit more in favor of negative employment effects
[Neumark and Wascher, 2007].
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fact that search frictions guarantee firms a monopsonistic position on the labor mar-
ket. A minimum wage then restricts the monopsony power of firms and redistributes
rents from firms to workers. Labor demand effects do not occur or only in the unlikely
case where the minimum wage increases so strong that all matches (for a certain skill
group) become unprofitable. Only one of the proposed models support the compres-
sion hypothesis: namely, the model with heterogeneity on both sides of the market.
In this model, this is the case, since the minimum wage makes a part of the matches
unprofitable and thus not every meeting does result in a match. A further possibility to
incorporate labor demand effects in a reasonable way in a model with search frictions
is to endogenize λ. This is done in Fitzenberger and Garloff [2007] and shown to imply
negative employment effects of minimum wages. Summarizing, in the search context,
no definite answer is available to the question of the influence of a binding minimum
wage on unemployment. In the spirit of Koning et al. [1995], one could argue that as
long as the minimum wage is not too high, there are no employment effects of mini-
mum wages and these only redistribute rents. However, considering the labor market
as an ensemble of segmented specific labor markets, as they do, suggests that a too
high minimum wage could make a whole segment unprofitable. In this case there
are pronounced employment effects. Note that when search frictions or more general
monopsonistic structures are important, it can be desirable to introduce or increase a
minimum wage in order to redistribute rents from firms to workers without incurring the
cost of increasing unemployment [see, e.g. Manning, 2003a].
In sum, search approaches offer a good alternative and complement to neo-classical
model frameworks. The frictional framework provides a basis for a better understand-
ing of labor market mechanisms in a world of imperfect information. It adds to our
understanding as far as labor market dynamics is concerned and as far as the deter-
minants of residual wage dispersion are concerned. Thus, the model is a valuable
alternative framework, for evaluating labor market policies, as for example minimum
wages. It turns out from our analysis above that the impact of minimum wages is com-
plex. Further theoretical and empirical work is necessary to decide on the issue of
employment and wage effects of a minimum wage legislation.
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5 Appendix
5.1 Derivation of the reservation wage as a function of the parameters
Consider the derivative ∂WL(w¯)∂w¯ from (5). Rewriting (5) asWL(w¯) =
w¯+δWU+λL
∫∞
w¯ WL(w)dH(w)
[r+δ+λL
∫∞
w¯ dH(w)]
,
the resulting derivative is given by W ′L(w¯) =
∂WL(w¯)
∂w¯ =
1
r+δ+λL(1−H(w¯)) .
35 Denote with
wo the upper limit of H(w), then integration by parts yields
∫ wo
wR
(WL(w)−WU )dH(w) =
[(WL(w)−WU )H(w)]wowR −
∫ wo
wR
H(w)W ′L(w)dw. This leads to:
wR = z + (λ− λL)
[
WL(wo)−WU −
∫ wo
wR
H(w)W ′L(w)dw
]
= z + (λ− λL)
[∫ wo
wR
(1−H(w))W ′L(w)dw
]
= z + (λ− λL)
∫ wo
wR
1−H(w)
r + δ + λL(1−H(w))dw.
The second row follows by using WL(wo) −WU =
∫ wo
wR
W ′L(w)dw and the above ex-
pression for W ′L(w).
5.2 Derivation of the equilibrium employment at wage w
Starting point for the derivation of (10), is the following equation which describes
inflows and outflows to firms paying wages above w, (λU + λLL(w))(1 − H(w)) =
δ(N − U − L(w)).
Differentiating both sides of the equation with respect to the wage, substituting h(w)
for H ′(w), using that L′(w) = l(w)h(w), and dividing by h(w) yields:
[δ + λL(1−H(w))]l(w) = λU + λLL(w). (34)
Firms maximize expected profits Π(w) = (y − w)l(w). The first-order condition for a
profit maximum yields the following differential equation:
l′(w)
l(w)
=
1
y − w . (35)
This equation holds for all firms that pay wages above wR. With the help of (35) l(w)
can be determined explicitly. Integrating both sides
∫ l′(w)
l(w) dw =
∫
1
y−wdw or log l(w) +
d1 = − log(y − w) + d2 is obtained, where d1 and d2 are integration constants. Letting
d = d2 − d1 and exponentiating both sides yields:
l(w) =
exp(d)
y − w =
D
y − w . (36)
35 The result is obtained by using the quotient rule and the fact that w¯+δWU+λL
∫∞
w¯ WL(w)dH(w)
[r+δ+λL
∫∞
w¯ dH(w)]
=
WL(w¯) =
A(w¯)
B(w¯)
. This yields W ′L(w¯) = A
′B−AB′
B2
= 1
B
(A′ − WL(w¯)B′) = 1B (1 − λLWL(w¯)h(w¯) +
λLWL(w¯)h(w¯)) =
1
B
.
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The integration constant D can be derived through the constraint that (34) imposes
on the above equation. Evaluating (34) and (36) at wR and imposing equality, I obtain
l(wR) = λUδ+λL =
D
y−wR or D =
λU
δ+λL
(y − wR). Using D and U in (36) provides the
solution to the differential equation: l(w) = λδN(δ+λL)(δ+λ) ·
y−wR
y−w .
The equilibrium profits of a firm that pays a wage from the support of the wage distri-
bution is given by Π(w) = (y − w)l(w) = λδN(y−wR)(δ+λL)(δ+λ) .
The upper limit of the support of wage distribution wo can be calculated by inserting
wo in (34) and in l(w) = λδN(δ+λL)(δ+λ) ·
y−wR
y−w , and solving for l(w
o), respectively. Noting
that L(wo) = N − U , I obtain
wo = y − (y − wR)
(
δ
δ + λL
)2
. (37)
as upper limit of the support of the wage distribution and the distribution of paid wages.
Note, that the highest paid wage is below the marginal productivity of the employees.
5.3 Profits with continuous productivity dispersion
The solution of (18) Π′(y) = l˘(K(y)) is obtained when integrating Π(y) =
∫ y
y Π
′(%)d% =
A+
∫ y
y l˘(K(%))d%. A is the integration constant and follows from (16), when evaluated
at (y,w), where w = max{wR, wmin}. Therewith, A = δδ+λL N−UM (y − w). Furthermore,
the share of firms that pays wages belowK(y) is equal to the share of firms whose pro-
ductivity is below y: H(K(y)) = Γ(y). Using (15), it is l˘(K(y)) = δ (N−U)M
δ+λL
[δ+λL(1−Γ(y))]2
and thus the profit function becomes:
Π(y) =
δ
δ + λL
N − U
M
(y − w) +
∫ y
y
δ
(N − U)
M
δ + λL
[δ + λL(1− Γ(%)]2d%
Π(y) =
∫ y
w
δ
(N − U)(δ + λL)
M
1
[δ + λL(1− Γ(%))]2d%. (38)
The second row follows from the fact that Γ(y) = 0 for y ∈ [w, y] and thus the integral
on the interval [w, y] in the second row, equals the first summand in the first row.
This equation yields the profit of a type y firm depending on the model parameters
and on the distribution of firm productivities. Solving Π(y) = (y − K(y))l˘(K(y)) with
respect to K(y) = w yields an expression for the wage as a function of the productivity
y: w = K(y) = y − Π(y)
l˘(K(y))
. Using the corresponding expressions yields: K(y) =
y − [δ + λL(1− Γ(y))]2
∫ y
w
1
[δ+λL(1−Γ(%))]2d%.
5.4 Variance analysis
Start by assuming a utility function with constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) and
consider a worker who is employed in a firm of type y, then: lnww(ε, y, y′) = ln ε +
lnww(1, y, y′). The conditional (on y) expectation of the log-wage is given by Postel-
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Vinay and Robin [2002a, p.2310]: E(ε,y′|y)(lnw|y) = Eε(ln ε)+E(y′|y)(lnww(1, y, y′)|y).36
Using independence of ε and (y, y′), the conditional (on y) variance is given by var(ε,y′|y)(lnw|y) =
varε(ln ε) + var(y′|y)(lnww(1, y, y′)|y). Applying this variance decomposition, the vari-
ance of wages can be decomposed in the variance of the conditional expectation of
wages and in the expectation of the conditional variance:
varw(lnw) = vary[E(ε,y′|y)(lnw|y)] + Ey[var(ε,y′|y)(lnw|y)]
= vary[Eε(ln ε) + E(y′|y)(lnww(1, y, y′)|y)] + Ey[varε(ln ε)
+var(y′|y)(lnww(1, y, y′)|y)].
Thus, the following decomposition of the wage variance is obtained:
varw(lnw) = varε(ln ε) +vary[E(y′|y)(lnww(1, y, y′)|y)] +Ey[var(y′|y)(lnww(1, y, y′)|y)].
The first summand of this formula results from productivity differences among employ-
ees. The second summand reflects the effect of different firm productivities on the
variance of paid wages. The expected wage changes along with y, the productivity
of the firm. The variance of the conditional expectation reflects the variance of wages
between firms of different productivities. Note, that the conditional expectation of the
log-wage and thus the variance of the second summand depends on the joint distri-
bution of y, y′. The third summand reflects wage fluctuations for firms and workers
whose productivity is identical. Thus, the wage fluctuations among identical individu-
als in identical firms are contained in this part.37 From the point of view of an individual
it is explained by the luck of receiving a valuable job offer that implies pay raises. The
extent of this variance is explained by frictions because frequent job offers lead to a
faster adjustment of wages to the marginal productivity and thus lowers the variance.
36 The indices indicate with respect to which variable the expectation is to be constructed.
37 This is the part of the wage dispersion that is explained by the model of Burdett and Mortensen [1998].
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